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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to compare the economic effects of sport stadiums 
on major league and minor league baseball cities by answering these four fundamental 
questions. 
1. Do the economic benefits that sport brings to the city outweigh the 
costs borne by taxpayers from public subsidies? 
2. Does athletic entertainment add to the spending in the city or replace 
spending on other entertainment areas? 
3. Who benefits from the sport stadium: the local economy or the owners 
and players ofthe baseball club? 
4. Do sport stadiums bring about the revitalization of urban areas? 
Cleveland" Ohio, (major league) and Indianapolis, Indiana, (minor league) were studied 
to determine if there were any economic effects from supporting a sport stadium. The 
two cities were then compared to determine the different effects between the minor 
league and major league. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The 1990s have seen a surge in sports stadium building (Johnson and Whitehead 
2000). In mid 1996, the total spending completed and planned for the decade topped $9 
billion, with more than 80 percent of the funding provided by state and local 
governments. 
The building boom is a trend that began in the 1950s (Johnson and Whitehead 
2000). Until then, most major league teams played in privately owned buildings, 
including 15 of 16 baseball teams. According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), the vast 
majority of new sports facilities were privately owned by one of the teams that played in 
them, until the 196Os. However, by 1989, 77 percent of major league baseball teams 
played in publicly owned buildings (Johnson and Whitehead 2000). 
According to Johnson and Whitehead (2000), building stadiums has become 
popular among state and local governments, but it has not proven financially lucrative for 
the cities. Publicly funded sports facilities fail to generate sufficient income for their 
owners to cover their total opportunity costs, according to Quirk and Fort. Some 
stadiums even fail to cover the variable costs of operation. 
Why do cities subsidize stadiums? 
The history of state and local debt finance in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries is packed with examples of bond issuance for canals, railroads, and land 
development plans that are motivated to spur real estate development (Noll and Zimbalist 
1997). Stadium building seems to be the modem-day counterpart to railroads for many 
cities. Therefore, chambers of commerce, downtown business associations and real 
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estate boards are frequent proponents of building stadiums. According to Noll and 
Zimbalist (1997), increases in activity in downtown areas have a positive impact on 
downtown real estate values. 
In most cases, cities provide subsidies in hopes of attracting a new team or to 
prevent an existing team from leaving (Noll and ZimbaIist 1997). This situation places 
local governments in an awkward position: the city must either provide a subsidized 
stadium or lose the team to another community that is more willing to provide a subsidy. 
Proponents of public stadiums claim that the positive externalities of teams and 
the stadiums are so powerful that total benefits exceed total costs (Johnson and 
Whitehead 2000; Noll and Zimbalist 1997). However, many of the benefits derive from 
externaIitil~s; therefore, no private investor could capture enough of the benefits to justify 
building a sports facility (Johnson and Whitehead 2000). Opponents of public funded 
stadiums counter that stadiums absorb scarce government resources, which should be 
used for tax reductions or programs having a higher social or economic payoff (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). 
The government will build a stadium if the city would be adversely affected by 
the loss of the franchise (Johnson and Whitehead 2000). The public good of civic pride 
may be a factor in the choice of many state and local governments to subsidize stadiums 
despite ovc!rwhelming evidence that the total costs exceed the direct and indirect benefits. 
There are two reasons for cities paying subsidies for stadiums (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
First, cities have relatively weak bargaining positions. Second, the "basic economic 
implausibility" of most new stadiums success as a purely private investments. 
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Justification for public subsidies for stadiums is that teams and facilities induce 
economic expansion, increase spending, create jobs, and provide externalities (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). The creation of jobs through public subsidies is inefficient and costly 
and increases the number of low-paying seasonal jobs in a community. 
What benefits are generated by sports stadiums? 
According to Johnson and Whitehead (2000), the positive externalities generated 
by sports teams create indirect and direct benefits. Indirect benefits come from team and 
stadium related activities that cause a net increase in the area's income. A new stadium 
attracts more tourists to town, which increases the production of hotel services and 
restaurant meals and will generate additional income. However, most of this increase in 
income will go to businesses other than the team. 
Until the 1950s, professional sports were limited to a few cities in the northeastern 
United States (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Therefore, the majority of fans had to travel a 
great distance to attend a professional baseball game. Subsequently, expansion and 
relocation brought multiple teams in each sport to every region of the country, which 
results in a higher fraction of the population that has a local team. This means that 
tourists have less reason to plan vacations around the opportunity to attend major league 
baseball games because a visit to almost any large metropolitan area brings a tourist to 
the home of a franchise. The increases in net economic activity is a result of people from 
outside the city attending a sporting event and spending money at the stadium and in 
surrounding neighborhoods. However, if there are more franchises, then economic 
benefits will decrease because of a decrease in tourism. 
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Direct benefits arise because teams produce public goods (Johnson and 
Whitehead 2000). Direct benefits are civic pride, fan loyalty, or community spirit and are 
"nonrivalrous" and "nonexcludable." These benefits are a direct result of the team's 
presence in the community. The cultural significance of sports exceeds the economic 
significance as a business, according to Noll and Zimbalist (Johnson and Whitehead 
2000). 
Where do stadium revenues come from? 
In the 1950s most of a team's revenues came from inside the stadium (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). Stadium related revenues consisted of ticket sales and minor amounts 
collected from concessions, publications, and in-stadium advertising. However, in the 
1960s the growth in the popularity of sports, along with the granting of antitrust 
immunity to professional baseball when selling broadcasting rights, caused revenues 
from broadcasting to shoot up and surpass in-stadium revenues in some cases. However, 
ticket sales still dominated in-stadium revenues well into the 1970s. The 1980s brought a 
rapid growth in revenues from other sources. Concessions and "pouring rights"(beer 
concessions), stadium naming rights, luxury boxes and personal seat licenses (PSLs) are 
some of the new revenue sources that stadiums and team owners are starting to tap into to 
increase profits. 
What effect do monopoly leagues have on public subsidies? 
Professional sports has expanded significantly since thel950s, yet the number of 
teams remains lower than the number of cities that can support a major league team (Noll 
and Zimbalist 1997). The minimum size of a metropolitan area that can support a team is 
shrinking because of the popularity of professional sports. When an expansion is 
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announced or a team is relocated, the number of cities that bid to host the team is much 
larger than the amount of teams available (Noll and Zimbalist 1997~ Rosentraub 1997b). 
The success of small-city franchises in Phoenix and st. Petersburg has proved that 
many comparable cities would be candidates for new teams, when a few years ago it 
would have been unheard of for a small market to win a team (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
This also leads to the conclusion that large markets could house more teams than they 
already have. 
The excess demand for sports franchises is a result of the monopolistic nature of 
Major League Baseball (MLB), according to Noll and Zimbalist (1997). Major league 
baseball creates scarcity by only allowing so many teams in existence at a certain time. 
Scarcity causes competitive bidding for teams that become available among cities that do 
not have teams. This bids up the price for franchises and the subsidy that a city is 
expected to pay in order to capture or retain a team. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem is the fact that billions of dollars of public money are being spent to 
build sport stadiums at the major league and minor league levels under the pretense that 
the city or region benefits economically from the investment. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to compare the economic effects of sport stadiums on 
major league and minor league baseball cities by answering these four fundamental 
questions. 
1. Do the economic benefits that sport brings to the city outweigh the costs borne 
by taxpayers from public subsidies? 
2. Does athletic entertainment add to the spending in the city or replace spending 
on other entertainment areas? 
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3. Who benefits from the sport stadium: the local economy or the owners and 
players ofthe baseball club? 
4. Do sport stadiums bring about the revitalization of urban areas? 
Cleveland" Ohio (major league) and Indianapolis, Indiana (minor league) will be studied 
to determine ifthere are any economic effects from supporting a sport stadium. 
Hypothesis 
Stadiums do not provide the economic benefits and returns that are found in the 
impact studies used to sway citizens to pass subsidy referendums. Also, stadiums by 
themselves will not be able to revitalize urban areas. Stadiums must be a part of a larger 
plan or project. Owners and players reap the benefits of publicly funded stadiums. The 
stadiums are publicly funded, yet the owners are financially able to fund the stadiums 
privately. 
Assumptions 
The following statements are assumptions that are carried throughout the paper. 
One of the most important assumptions is that voters approve all stadium subsidy 
referendums. This means that they approved the tax increases to build the new stadiums. 
Public subsidies are used to finance stadiums because owners or franchises do not have 
the financial resources to privately build stadiums. Since the case studies involving the 
Cleveland Indians and Indianapolis Indians involve information only in the short-run, it 
must be assumed that the effects on the economy will be similar for the communities in 
the long-run. Also, I assume that the economic effects generated by the Cleveland 
Indians and the Indianapolis Indians on their respective communities are comparable to 
the economic effects of baseball franchises in other regions of the United States. 
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Limitations 
One of the most important limitations in this paper is that only stadiums that were 
built with public funding are researched and discussed. None of the stadiums that have 
recently been built with private funds are discussed. Another limitation is the fact that 
the two cases studied: Cleveland, Ohio and Indianapolis, Indiana were both built as 
projects to revitalize downtown areas. Therefore, the stadiums for the Cleveland Indians 
and the Indianapolis Indians were not built solely to house the franchise but were part of 
a larger project. Also, the fact that both teams are located in the Midwest could limit the 
research in terms of effects in other regions of the United States. Another limitation that 
must be taken into consideration involves the two case studies. Because both Jacobs 
Field and Victory Field are stadiums that were built in the 1990s, the information about 
their effects on the community's economy are short-run effects. Also, only minor league 
baseball teams at the triple A level were studied along with all of the major league 
baseball teams. 
Definitions 
A subsidy is financial aid or a government grant for various purposes. 
Externalities can be in the form of costs and benefits. External costs are activities that 
impose costs on others not directly involved without any compensation for the negative 
effects. External benefits are activities that benefit others that are not directly involved 
with the activity, but make no payments for the benefits. A referendum is a popular vote 
for ascertaining the public will on a single definite issue. When a stadium is paid for and 
managed by the local government authority and if any deficit is covered by the 
government, then the facility is considered "public" (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
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However, when direct construction costs are paid by the team, financing is considered 
"private" (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
Organization of the Paper 
The information contained in this section comes from early studies of stadium 
economics. The second section presents the current state of literature. Chapter 3 
discusses the previous methodology used by economist and the methodology for this 
paper. The fourth section states the results of the case studies from Cleveland, Ohio and 
Indianapolis, Indiana. The fifth and final section discusses the results and gives the 
conclusions of the literature and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Subsidizing Sport Stadiums 
In the 1990s alone, 30 professional sports arenas have been built in the United 
States with a total cost of over $4 billion (Laing 1996). Most of the $4 billion is being 
financed by state and local governments despite the fact that budgets are tight 
everywhere. It is alleged that financing sports stadiums with government money causes 
schools and social programs to face deep cutbacks. However, voters regularly approve 
referendums to allow large amounts of city and state money to back projects that will 
cater to sports fans that can afford to pay for lUXUry box seats. In these situations, the 
average taxpayer is consigned to the "cheap" seats in the nosebleed section or delegated 
to following their favorite team on cable television. 
The modem sports welfare system was born in the 1980s as willing governments 
were found that were eager to create the revenue streams owners and players wanted 
(Rosentraub 1997a). According to Rosentraub (1997a), the only things necessary to make 
the system work are willing public-sector partners who could be persuaded to contribute 
large amounts of tax dollars to the building of arenas and stadiums. One of the reasons 
why sport subsidies exist is a result of the social and psychological significance of sports 
substantially exceeding the economic value (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Another reason 
may be the belief that stadiums are an engine of local economic development. 
Public ownership also allows teams and cities to capture federal tax benefits for 
constructing stadiums, which causes people who live away from the stadium to pay part 
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of the cost for the hometown team (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The community leaders 
anticipate receiving a large return on their investments and few bother to ask whether 
cities could prosper from professional sports (Rosentraub 1997a). 
In the 1980s, state and local governments formed partnerships with teams to build 
new facilities (Rosentraub 1997a). By the end of the decade and into the 1990s, all of 
these venues contained substantial numbers ofluxury suites and club seats. Through 
public/private partnerships, the public sectors responsibility for part of the cost of 
stadiums actually declined. In the 1970s, governments were responsible for 90% ofthe 
cost typically, and by the 1990s the public sector was backing 60% of the construction 
cost. Table 2-1 shows the increasing costs of stadiums and how they were financed, by 
the public sector or the private sector. 
Laing (1996) argues that privately funded stadiums also benefit from public 
subsidies in the form ofland donations and free infrastructure improvements. The two 
most prominent stadiums that have taken this route are Ericsson Stadium in Charlotte, 
North Carolina for the Panthers and the new baseball stadium for the San Francisco 
Giants. Even though stadiums are not entirely privately funded, if the franchise owns the 
stadium, they are less likely to pick up and move to another city (Becker 1996). 
However, stadium subsidies may exist because these facilities are not financially 
attractive as private investments (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Even if total benefits exceed 
total costs, private investors may not want to build the stadium (Johnson and Whitehead 
2000). Private investors will want to build the stadium only if the use value exceeds the 
total costs. Ifuse values are less than the total costs, private investors would lose even if 
total benefits exceed total costs. Noll and Zimbalist (1997) explain that stadiums are not 
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financially viable if they must improve the profitability of a team and pay for themselves. 
This is a reason why local governments have problems finding a combination of rents, 
fees, and taxes to pay for stadiums. 
Table 2-1 
Costly Building Boom 
Approximate Total Cost Debt 
Facilityffeam (millions) Opened Type 
Coors Field 
Colorado Rockies 215 1995 Public 
Orioles Park at Camden Yards 
Baltimore Orioles 210 1992 PIP* 
Ballpark of Arlington 
Texas Rangers 191 1994 PIP 
Jacobs Field 
Cleveland Indians 168 1994 PIP 
Comiskey Park 
Chicago White Sox 150 1991 Public 
Source: Jonathan R. Laing (1996) "Foul Play? Team ov.ners get sports palaces and fat concession deals. Taxpayers get stuck with the 
tab." Barron's August 19,23-27. 
·P/P: the stadium had public and private financing 
Cities build new stadiums to provide the city with sufficient spillover benefits to 
make the facility worthwhile (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). According to Noll and 
Zimbalist (1997), the support of stadium subsidies as a political matter relies on two key 
points: 
1. The interests behind the stadium, such as local contractors and 
construction unions, cannot benefit unless the stadium is built. 
2. People in general are willing to subsidize a team indirectly by 
providing a stadium even if it costs more. 
Subsidized facilities exist because most cities have decided that a subsidized team is 
better than no team. Noll and Zimbalist (1997) explain that the scarcity in the number of 
teams gives owners the advantage in bargaining with city officials and the officials must 
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provide larger and more lucrative subsidies in order to keep the teams at home. As a 
result, subsidized stadiums do not exist because they are financially valuable assets. 
According to Baade and Dye (1990), direct economic benefits or stadium revenue 
is derived from rent, concessions, parking, advertising, suite rental and preferred seating 
rental. Direct expenses include wages and related expenses, utilities, repairs and 
maintenance, insurance, and debt amortization. Benjamin Okner states that while 
revenues are sufficient to cover stadium-operating expenses, they are insufficient to cover 
operating costs plus debt amortization. 
When a stadium is publicly owned through a subsidy, the city rents the facility 
back to tht~ teams (Baade and Dye 1990). Reduced profits for teams translate into 
reduced rents for municipalities. In many cities, the rent paid by a team is based on team 
attendance. The Cleveland Indians are one such team whose rents are based on 
attendance levels. Table 2-2 shows how rent was set up to payoff the public debt in the 
case of the' Cleveland Indians. Because professional sports teams have used their 
monopoly power to limit expansion, the number of cities seeking franchises outnumbers 
the supply of teams. In this seller's market, cities have been known to offer their facilities 
rent-free to teams they are courting or trying to retain. 
Table 2-2 
Rental Charges for the Cleveland Indians' Use of Jacobs Field 
Amount Paid to Gateway Total Paid if 3 Million 
Attendance Levels Per Ticket Sold Tickets Sold 
° to 1,850,000 $0.00 $0.00 
1,850,001 to 2,250,000 0.75 per ticket sold $300,000 
2,250,001 to 2,500,000 1.00 per ticket sold $250,000 
2,500,001 or more 1.25 per ticket sold $625,000 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
Clty,NY. 
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Economic Impact of Stadiums 
The Dictionary of Modem Economics defines economic development as 
"improving the standard of living and well being of the population" (Ellen and Schwartz 
2000). Economic development is often used more narrowly to mean increasing income 
or the number of jobs, which may exclude "consumption benefits" or costs of the 
policies. According to Laing (1996), cities try to make new stadiums more attractive to 
their electorates by offering "economic impact" studies showing the benefits to regional 
income and employment that such a project would produce. According to McGraw 
(1996), one economic rationale behind taxpayer funding of stadiums is that the public 
investment will spur economic growth and create jobs. Stadiums do generate 
employment and investment in a community, but the economic benefits pale in 
comparison to the public expenditure. 
Economics and Financing. According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), the two 
areas to be examined are stadium economics and financing. These are very different 
terms and must be defined to understand the impact of sports facilities on a city. Stadium 
financing refers to the narrow question of who pays for construction and operating the 
stadium, whereas stadium economics refers to the wider question of how the stadium 
affects the local economic welfare. 
Stadium economics is the debate that focuses onjobs and income creation in the 
community where the facility is built (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). However, stadium 
economics encompasses regional and national wealth as we1l as the welfare of sports fans 
and the distribution of income. Stadium economics will be discussed further throughout 
the rest of the chapter. 
15 
Stadium financing refers strictly to the expenditures and revenues directly 
associated with building and operating the stadium, where the financial responsibility is 
usually shared (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The financial responsibility is normally shared 
by the team, other private sector entities, local government and occasionally state 
government. 
In order to pay for its part of the stadium, local governments rely on a 
combination of rents, taxes, and fees on activities related to the facility; other taxes; and 
cuts in other public services (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Stadium financing provides a 
link between the expenditures on the stadium and the sources of revenues used. 
The life of a stadium has three or sometimes four stages. First, the site is acquired 
and existing facilities that are no longer usable are destroyed. Second, the stadium and 
infrastructure, such as sewage linkups, utility connections, parking, transportation access, 
are built. Third, repair, maintenance, and operations activities are undertaken to support 
the events held in the stadium. When there is a fourth stage, it involves the razing of the 
stadium to build another facility in its place (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), the standard practice is for local and 
state governments to pay for most and usually all ofthe site preparation. Governments 
may also pay for the acquisition of land, but normally they already own it. In terms of 
paying for the stadium, arrangements are considered "public" if the facility is paid for and 
managed by the local government authority and if any deficit is covered by the 
government. However, when direct construction costs are paid by the team, the financing 
is considered "private." 
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Another difference in the types of arrangements is who receives the revenues 
from the sale of special rights. The nature of the arrangements depends on who owns the 
stadium, the team or government authority (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Ownership 
determines whether the team or the city will absorb the risk that the revenues will be less 
than the amount that is assumed in the financial plan. According to Rosentraub (1997b), 
the revenues entailed include: 
1. stadium naming rights 
2. pouring rights, which are on alcoholic beverages 
3. executive boxes 
4. club seats 
5. PSLs. 
These reVt~nues can be transferred from the team to the city in order to help pay off the 
subsidies (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1997b). 
Stadium financing plans can take on many different forms depending on the scope 
of stadium related tax collections that are balanced against city expenditures (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). The plan normally includes rents and taxes on in-stadium revenues. 
The facili~y pays some property tax in most cases, which are counted as stadium-related 
tax revenues. If the facility is going to generate new business in the surrounding 
community, the financial plan may attribute sales, income, and property taxes from the 
area around the stadium. The revenue generated by the surrounding community is 
considered "tax increment financing." Many cities and states have included taxes that are 
unrelated to the stadiums. These plans include the state lottery, special sales tax, alcohol 
and tobacco taxes, hotel taxes and special fees on car rentals. 
Benefits and Costs. The benefits and costs of a public investment faU into four 
general categories: direct benefits, indirect benefits, initial costs, and the costs of 
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operation. Direct benefits are described as the "value consumers attach to the output 
from the public investment" (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Indirect benefits are all of the 
additional consumption that takes place in response to the generation of any new income 
in the production of concession consumer products. If an investment does not generate a 
net increase in income, the public investment can be worthwhile only if the direct 
consumption benefits exceed the costs. If all the benefits are direct consumption benefits, 
the private sector will have incentives to make the investment because consumers will 
pay enough for the product for private investors to cover their costs. 
Costs consist of the initial cost of the investment and the stream of costs 
associated with producing the stream of consumer benefits from the facility (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). The relevant cost concept is not the actual financial costs to the local 
government, but the opportunity cost of the investment. Opportunity cost is defined as 
the "economic cost of an investment is the sacrifice in other activities that was required to 
undertake the investment." However, this is not the amount spent on the project. 
According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), there are two reasons why opportunity costs and 
financial costs can be substantially different: 
1. A public investment is costly to society only if the resources used to 
build and operate it are transferred from other valuable economic 
activities. 
2. The financial costs of public investments ultimately are paid from 
taxation. This can take place immediately or at a later date to payoff 
the public debt. 
The taxation also imposes an additional opportunity cost because it reduces the 
consumption of taxed goods. If an economy is operating at full employment, the 
opportunity cost of a subsidy can be greater than the financial cost. According to Noll 
and Zimbalist (1997), the key point is that under conditions of full employment, 
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expenditures on the stadium, including the wages of construction workers, are a cost not a 
benefit, bec;ause these expenditures approximately measure the sacrifice in the production 
and consumption of other goods that must be made in order to build the sports facility. 
As a result of the significance of opportunity costs, a public investment should be 
evaluated in terms of the best alternative way to use the same resources. 
In order for a stadium to be the best choice, it must generate net benefits that 
exceed the alternative uses (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The opportunity forgone in 
building a stadium is not the cost of the stadium, but the benefits from the other ways the 
money could be spent. 
Employment. In order to determine if sports stadiums should be subsidized, city 
officials m~ed to look at whether a new stadium will in fact stimulate job growth beyond 
what could be expected from an alternative use of public and private funds (Noll and 
Zimbalist (997). The primary reason for the optimism of job creation potential is the 
assumption that an increase in sport-generated revenues corresponds to an expansion of 
the local economy. If professional sports do not correlate with an increase in net new 
spending, jobs will not be created. The number of jobs created is not the sole factor to 
indicate the employment effect of professional sports. According to Noll and Zimbalist 
(1997), two other factors must be included: 
1. the types of jobs sports subsidies generate; 
2. the costs involved in creating jobs through sports subsidies. 
The jobs generated by professional sports activities are concentrated in the 
nonmanufacturing sector and the concentration may be as high as 98 percent (Noll and 
Zimbalist (997). Almost all jobs can be placed under "trade" and "services," in 
accordance with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Professional sports 
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activities are seasonal and events are completed during a portion of a workday; therefore 
most jobs qualify as part-time and seasonal work. This causes most of the jobs in 
professional sports to be at the low-wage end of the "trade" and "services" sectors. One 
point to remember is that most of the part-time stadium-related jobs are held by people 
who are moonlighting, and this work is not the primary source of income, according to 
Baade and Allen Sanderson. The types of jobs created by stadium activity are low-wage 
and seasonal: ticket takers, ushers, vendors, restaurant and bar workers, taxi drivers 
(Baade and Dye 1990). 
Thj s could lead the city to gain a comparative advantage in unskilled and seasonal 
labor and therefore future growth in the metropolitan area will be concentrated in low-
income jobs (Baade and Dye 1990). 
Table 2-3 
Compensation for Major League Baseball Players and Stadium Workers, 
Milwaukee 1994 
Compensation 
Pay 
Pension 
Health Insurance 
Uniforms 
Food 
Players 
$1.2 million on 
Average per year for 
All MLB players 
Yes 
Yes 
Supplied 
Free postgame 
Buffet 
Grounds Crew 
$4.85 - $6.56 per 
hour 
No 
No 
Supplied* 
Discounts on brats 
and hot dogs 
Usbers 
$5.40 - $6.38 per 
hour 
No 
No 
Charged to 
Worker 
Discounts on 
brats and hot 
dogs 
Source: Robert L. Rose, "Stadiwn Workers Say Union Solidarity Doesn't Extend to Millionaire Players<" Wall Street Journal, 
March 9, 1995 p. 11 
* Groullds crewmembers each pay a $25 deposit for ulliforms. 
Baade and Sanderson provide an example of the effects of the new stadium for the 
Arizona Diamondbacks and the effects on employment in Phoenix. 
"In July 1990 the Arizona state legislature authorized the use 
of more than $240 million to finance the construction of a 
retractable dome stadium for use by the Arizona Diamondbacks, 
a Major League Baseball expansion franchise. The Arizona 
Office of Sports Development commissioned a study by Deloitte & 
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Touche to estimate the economic impact ofthe franchise. In 
the stadium's operational phase, the state was expected to gain 
340 full-time equivalent jobs. On a base of $240 million, 
taxpayers in the state of Arizona are paying approximately $705,800 
for each job created (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
The Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 (LPW I) and 
the Local Public Works Capital Employment Act of 1977 (LPW II) created direct and 
indirect jobs at an average cost of $37,000 for a person-year. If the nominal cost of 
creating these jobs doubled between 1980 and 1996, the average cost per person-year 
would be $74,000. By any economic standard, the cost of creating jobs through 
professional sports is substantial, defined both in terms of current outlay and the present 
value of the returns through job creation. 
According to Rosentraub (1997a), even in urban areas with multiple teams, the 
professional sports sector accounts for less that 1 % of the county's private sector payroll 
or 1 % of all the private sector's jobs. In fact, it would take $100,000 of government 
money to create a single stadium-connected job, according to Allan Sanderson (Murphy 
1998). 
The total budget of a sports team is relatively small and the bulk of jobs created 
are seasonal and low paying (McGraw 1996). Sports teams are small to medium sized 
firms that are clearly "vibrant, vital and important components" of any city or county's 
economy, but no more so than any other companies (Rosentraub 1997a). Noll and 
Zimbalist 0997) agree that sports teams are considerably smaller businesses than many 
less visible enterprises. An example of such is a major university that is not only larger 
than any sports team, but may exceed the size of the entire league. Sports teams are not 
economic engines by themselves; they have too few employees and involve too few 
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direct dollars to be a driving force in any city or county's economy (Zimbalist 1997; 
Rosentraub 1997a). 
According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), in order for jobs to be created within a 
metropolitan area, sports would have to either increase the spending on city goods and 
services or move spending shifts toward industry. Also, creating jobs through subsidies 
is inefficient and costly in the area of sports. The jobs created are low paying and 
seasonal, therefore, the return on the investment for the city is much lower than if the 
money was invested in an industrial park or a department store. 
Fan Spending. Stanford University economist, Roger Noll, states that the 
majority of fans attending games come from within a 20-mile radius of the stadium 
(Laing 1996). The money fans spend on professional sports is mostly discretionary 
entertainment spending, which would take place even if the teams were not around 
(McGraw 1996). The money spent at the ball game would have been spent on other areas 
of local entertainment or recreation instead (Laing 1996). This "substitution effect" of 
money spent in the city means that stadiums may actually represent very little net 
economic gain to local businesses, if any. Attendance at a sporting event is just one way 
people can spend their recreation dollars, and in this way the economic effect is a 
substitution (Rosentraub 1997b). Therefore, if the spending would have taken place 
anyway, then there is no economic growth. 
According to Rosentraub (1997a), a substantial portion of the spending that takes 
place at stadiums, restaurants and retail outlets near or in the sports venues is merely a 
transfer of economic activity within the community. If the fans would have eaten at a 
restaurant near their home, then the consumption of food as part of the sporting event is 
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merely a transfer of expenditures from a restaurant near their home to one close to the 
stadium (Rosentraub 1997b). The change of locations for the expenditure creates an 
impact in other areas; more spending near the stadium and less in the neighborhood. 
However, from the economy's perspective, there is no growth or increase in spending 
levels, only a transfer offunds. Ranchette (2000) argues that much of the economic 
benefits from stadiums are in "a very narrowly defined community" surrounding the 
stadium as fans patronize nearby restaurants, bars, and hotels. 
According to Rosentraub (1997b), positive economic impact is new spending or 
economic activity brought to a neighborhood, community, city or county in which the 
stadium is located. This can occur in two ways: 
1. people from outside the area, city or county come to attend a game and 
spend money they would not have spent in the are~ city or county; 
2. people in the area, city or county decide to spend money there instead 
of going elsewhere for their recreation. 
The second point is considered deflected impact or growth in the sense that instead of 
going to Atlanta for a game, people in Tampa Bay spend their recreation dollars in 
Tampa Bay. Spiers (1996) agrees that net benefits to the economy occur only when 
people come from outside the area to see a game. 
Thc~ economic impact studies also wreak havoc on the multiplier or "ripple effect" 
of fan spending (Laing 1996). The deflection or substitution of money from other 
sources means that cities can anticipate between 12 to 34 percent of attendance at a 
sporting event to represent deflected activity or an increase in spending levels in a 
community (Rosentraub 1997b). The deflection or substitution also depends on the 
extent of the center city as a recreational hub for the region. Projections of overall 
economic impact are going to include a great deal of money that is already circulating in 
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the community. This causes the stadium to take recreation money away from other 
activities. However, there will be an increase in dollars at the expense of cities in the 
region that do not have a professional sports team. 
Minor League Baseball 
In 1990, minor league baseball attendance reached a 39-year high of 25 million 
(Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony 1994). However, this is far less than the 40 
million in attendance in 1949, but there is little doubt that a renaissance for minor league 
baseball has taken place. 
In the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA), the financial fortunes of 
major league baseball and minor league baseball were changed (Noll and Zimbalist 
1997). In the PBA, Attachment 58, Minor League Facility Standards and Compliance 
Inspection Procedures was passed. Attachment 58 puts a financial burden on minor 
league baseball communities because many stadiums will need renovations or to be 
rebuilt. Ifa community does not comply with the new standards imposed, major league 
baseball has threatened to tenninate the minor league club. 
However, the minor league owners have enthusiastically accepted A58 because 
the new and renovated stadiums will increase their bottom lines. Also, Attachment 58 
forces minor league communities to improve the financial perfonnance of the major 
leagues in the following ways. 
1. Minor league clubs must renovate old or construct new stadiums and 
certain elements must be included in order to comply with A58. 
2. In response to the threat that teams that do not comply with A58 will 
lose their major league affiliate and their player development 
contracts, minor league clubs pressure the host cities to provide 
funding for the construction of the stadiums. 
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3. Once a minor league team has a new stadium their finances improve, 
which allows MLB to reduce the subsidies they give to the minor 
leagues. 
Therefore, A58 has had a positive impact for the players and owners in both the major 
and minor leagues. 
However, the effects on the communities that fund the renovations for teams to 
comply with A58 are heavily burdened (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The minor league 
communities are burdened more than major league cities because the economic benefits 
of operating a minor league club are insufficient to offset the cost of renovating an old 
stadium or constructing a new facility. The two tables show how stadium renovation and 
construction has changed since 1985. 
Table 2-4 
Number ofNAPBL Ballparks Constructed or Renovated by Minor League 
Classification, 1985-2000 
Period AAA AA A An 
1985-90 
New 3 2 7 12 
Renovated 0 3 2 5 
1991-95 
New 6 7 26 39 
Renovated 9 9 43 61 
1996-2000 
New 6 2 4 12 
Renovated 1 2 7 10 
Source: Noll, Roger G.; Zimbalist, Andrew editors (1997) Sports Jobs, and Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and 
stadiums, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 
There was a definite increase in the cost of stadiums after A58 was put into effect. This 
increase in construction costs has significantly burdened communities to subsidize new 
stadiums or facility renovations. The burden results from minor league teams not being 
able to fund new stadiums on their own. The minor leagues have very small profit 
margins that would further decrease if they had to provide their own stadium financing. 
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Table 2-5 
A verag(~ Construction Costs or Renovation Costs for NAPBL Ballparks Built or 
Renovated during 1985-2000 by Minor League Classification 
Millions of Cunent Dollars 
Period AAA AA A All 
1985-90 
New 32.7 3.5 2.6 7.3 
Renovated 0.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 
1991-95 
New 18.9 7.8 6.8 8.8 
Renovated 2.8 1.2 0.8 1.1 
1996-2000 
New 26.5 20.0 11.0 20.0 
Renovated 12.0 3.3 1.3 2.8 
Source: Noll, Roger G.; Zimbalist, Andrew editors (1997) Sports Jobs. and Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and 
stadituns, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 
The impact of a minor league team is less likely to occur than at the major league 
level (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The economic impact of a minor league team is 
relatively small because it is unlikely to draw many out of town fans (Fulton 1996). 
Arthur Johnson states in "Different Aims Put Two Levels at Odds:" 
A major league team is capable of attracting millions of fans 
to a stadium in one season, whereas even a successful minor 
league team rarely draws more than a few hundred thousand fans. 
A major league team attracts many fans from beyond its local 
jurisdiction, especially for postseason play, but this is not the 
case with a minor league team. A major league team brings 
national recognition to a city, but it is arguable that the 
average minor league team brings not even regional recognition 
to its host community (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
The most optimistic observers do not believe that a city with a minor league team would 
breakeven operating the stadium (Fulton ] 996). Minor league teams produce few of the 
public goods produced by major league sports (Johnson and Whitehead 2000). As a 
resu1t, few minor league stadiums merit public subsidy. Therefore, the results of 
nonusers, or people that will not receive any benefits from the team, do not want to pay 
for a new stadium. 
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Communities have increased efforts to attract a minor league baseball team by 
providing funding support (Colclough, Daellenbach and Sherony 1994). Even though the 
minor leagues do not create money for the city in which they are located, the minor 
leagues an: becoming big business, and cities are fighting to get a piece of the 
professional baseball pie (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Therefore, if the community does 
not offer support to generate a competitive return on the investment in the baseball team, 
investors will move the team to a location that provides: 
• Increased interest 
• Greater public sector support 
• Greater return on the investment (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
Just like in the major leagues, the minor league owners know that there is enough demand 
for minor league clubs that cities will provide subsidies to get a team in their community. 
This puts pressure on the current host city when the team wants renovations or a new 
stadium to use a subsidy so that the team does not relocate in a different community. The 
number of franchise relocations in minor league baseball proves that there is not a 
shortage of cities that are willing to house a team. 
One of the reasons used to back stadiums as a public investment is the fact that 
the benefits are in excess of the costs incurred (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Noll and 
Zimbalist (1997) state that the reason benefits outweigh the costs is that benefits include 
things that qualifY as "psychic" or "nonmonetary" in nature. These benefits are related to 
the enhanced quality of life that professional sports provide to the community. 
Proponents of publicly funded stadiums state that games would increase 
enjoyment for those who attend and the team would add to the sense of community 
identification and pride (Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony 1994). In the viewpoint of 
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the community, minor league baseball is less about baseball and more about family 
entertainment which helps define a city's livability (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). After this 
statement, the stadium is really an issue where economics plays a role in the public 
decision, but may not be the overriding information for making a public funding decision. 
Most supporters of public funding of sports stadiums assert that minor league baseball 
yields psychological benefits through identification with a professional baseball team. 
Minor league teams have sources of revenue other than from operating a stadium 
(Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony 1994). The largest nonloca1-funding source for 
team operating expenses was the Player Development Contract (PDC), which is between 
the minor league team and its major league affiliate. The PDC stipulates the provision of 
players, coaches and financial support by the major league team. Minor league teams 
also receive revenue from national advertisers placing local ads on the outfield fence. 
Two other external sources of team revenue are ticket and concession sales to noniocal 
fans. The General Manager survey given by Colclough, Daellenbach and Sherony (1994) 
indicated that 73 percent of the fans at Midwest League games were residents of the city 
where the team played, 15 percent resided within ten miles, seven-percent within 11-30 
miles and five-percent beyond 30 miles. 
However, Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony (1994) state that expenditures 
within the city would increase due to the team. This is a result of visiting team members 
and their entourage and nonlocal fans spending money at local businesses. The spending 
would affect retail trade, eating and drinking, lodging, and amusement. Visitors include 
fans that live more than 30 miles from the city, which include visiting team members, 
umpires and major league scouts. 
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Urban Revitalization 
Cities choose to get involved with sports for a variety of reasons: to help rebuild 
downtown areas, for direct economic development, and to improve the city identity as a 
major league community (Rosentraub 1997a). Municipalities also fight to retain teams to 
avoid a loss of identity or to avoid a stigma of decline. Professional sports teams have 
been able to establish themselves as key commodities in this battle for image. At the 
very minimum, sports help a city become "a nice place to live" according to Rosentraub 
(l997b). However, Williams (2000) states that stadiums are "critical" to open the door 
for urban development. The revitalization of downtown areas happens by concentrating 
on retail, transportation, business, parking and residential areas. 
According to Laing (1996), major corporations may not locate their headquarters 
in a city that does not have a professional sports team. Baade and Dye (1990) agree that 
sports-based development may attract new unrelated businesses to the area because of the 
image of being "major league." Also, proponents of stadiums claim that industry is more 
likely to locate in cities with major league sports franchises (NoH and Zimbalist 1997). 
Corporate executives prefer cities with major league sports teams; and therefore, in a 
close decision about where to locate a new business facility, they will favor these cities. 
In fact, several business leaders have openly stated that they consider the status of major 
league sports when making such decisions. 
Rosentraub (1997a) argues that while sports are an important part of any 
community's quality of life, they probably do not attract business into the area. There are 
too many factors that affect a corporation's decision regarding where to locate. However, 
a sports team can make an important contribution to the definition of quality of life in a 
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community, which can help define a city or region's image and add attractiveness to 
corporations (Rosentraub 1997b). According to Noll and Zimbalist (1997), sports teams 
have no long-run employment effects and research on corporation location decisions 
show that statistically costs, the quality of the local labor force, and city amenities, such 
as the quality of education and health care, are the factors that affect corporate location 
decisions. 
While stadium mania sweeps the United States, many city officials across the 
country believe that stadiums and commercial sport are essential for projecting a "world-
class" image (Baade and Dye, 1990). The argument given is that sports and therefore 
stadiums provide tangible economic benefits for the local economy, and this prosperity 
enhances the city's reputation. Sports generate prestige and reputations for cities that are 
able to use sports to define themselves and illustrate the ability to dominate other cities, 
cultures, and systems (Rosentraub 1997b). A few of Rosentraub's (1997b) examples of 
this effect are illustrated by Green Bay, Wisconsin being called "Titletown, USA", the 
Dallas Cowboys being "America's Team", and the Chicago Bears being called the 
"Monsters of the Midway." In this way cities can develop their own identity through 
sports. 
Likewise, attracting and retaining a major league sports team is a valid end 
because the team is valuable to local residents, despite any contribution of the stadium 
and the team to the economy (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Therefore, if a subsidy is 
needed to retain or attract a team, the city should provide it. However, the city should 
investigate what could happen to the image of the city with the team and what would 
occur after the team would leave if that would ever happen (Rosentraub 1997b). 
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Once city officials have recognized that stadiums are a very small part of an area's 
economy, then they discover that sports can contribute to development by creating a 
"glue" that holds together important economic interests (Rosentraub 1997b). This is 
accomplished by sports' nature of importance in and for society. Sports can foster growth 
through their importance to society because people consider a city "big time" or "major 
league" if it is a sports center. 
In order to receive the most gains from urban revitalization, the city must have a 
specific plan in place to achieve the goals (Rosentraub 1997b). The plan must determine 
if the revitllization is for the downtown area or for the entire region. Too many times 
city officia1s have hoped that a stadium would "jumpstart" the economy of an area or 
region; however, by themselves sports facilities cannot jumpstart even a small part of the 
downtown economy. In contrast, if there is a specific plan in place, the stadium could be 
helpful and useful in the strategy to revitalize an area. 
The impact on urban areas has increased greatly in the past decade due to a 
change in lhe structure of stadiums built. In the 1970s, stadiums were built in the shape 
of a donut and surrounded by surface parking (McGraw 1996). This allowed fans to go 
from their car to the game and back home again. Williams (2000) agrees that sports 
facilities work best when integrated with other downtown facilities and not surrounded by 
parking lots. Williams (2000) says, "Don't build the fastest in-and-out stadium. If you do 
that, you will never get economic return from the stadium. You get return from buildup 
around the stadium." Likewise, the new ballparks, ( Camden Yards in Baltimore, Coors 
Field in Dt:nver, and Jacobs Field in Cleveland) are integrated into urban neighborhoods, 
and fans can walk from downtown areas (McGraw 1996, Benini 1999, Rosentraub 
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1997b). EUen and Schwartz (2000) agree that the location of a stadium in a metropolitan 
area does matter. This increased traffic helps bars, restaurants and retail shops according 
to McGraw (1996). 
Ovmers also recognize the fact that stadiums located in "colorful" urban areas will 
increase the franchise revenue streams and market value (Fulton 1999). The new way to 
sell sports stadiums is to use the stadium as a vehicle that will revitalize and anchor an 
entire urban development scheme. This takes the place of subsidizing the stadiums and 
putting the burden of paying for the stadiums on the taxpayers. Fulton (1999) states that 
this should be an urban revitalization partnership so that the franchise owners become 
developers and the taxpayers do not have to foot the entire bill. According to Mitchell 
(1998), this also improves the public image of owners from a "tax vulture to a visionary 
civic leader." 
There are currently 22 stadiums under development in the United States and three 
of these 22 are becoming a part of large commercial and real estate developments headed 
by team owners (Mitchell 1998). This is illustrated by the Padres deal with San Diego 
(Fulton 1999). John Moores, owner of the Padres and Qualcomm software king, is 
responsible for a $1 billion plan to "revive a historic, colorful and somewhat run-down 
26-square-block area called East Village," which is in downtown San Diego. In return, 
the city will help build a new stadium at a cost of $400 million. The idea of tying the 
fortunes of a city and a ball club together seems to be the wave of the future, which gives 
the owners enough of a stake in the community to not want to move their team and lose 
money on the investment. 
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Cities have often used incentives to encourage development in particular areas. If 
teams or stadiums do energize a downtown area, any public money dedicated to the 
project is a. wise investment (Rosentraub 1997b). However, the success of these cities 
from their investment in sports must be measured to show the extent of downtown areas 
that became or remained vital as employment, housing or recreational centers. There are 
cities in thl~ Rust Belt and the Sun Belt that have used sports and the public sector 
partnerships with teams for reconstructing or reestablishing the importance of downtown 
areas. The: cities in the Rust Belt are Cleveland, Ohio and Indianapolis, Indiana that have 
used sports as an important part of the redefinition of downtown. Phoenix, Arizona and 
Dallas, Texas are the most notable of the cities in the Sun Belt that have utilized sports to 
reestablish their downtown. 
Increasing Owner and Player Wealth 
From 1993 to 1995, $7 billion have been spent or committed to build or renovate 
30 major sports facilities in America (McGraw 1996). However the current stadiums are 
not wearing out, but are considered "financially obsolete" by team owners. "Financially 
obsolete" means that there are not enough luxury boxes, which are "superprofitable" and 
owners want new stadiums that are ringed with the luxury suites. 
According to Rosentraub (1997b), annual suite and premium rental charges for 
teams create greater streams of revenue in new facilities. Suite and club or premium 
seating fees involve two different packages. In suite seating, a business or individual 
purchases a lease for an entertainment, reception or living room area that also has from 
eight to sixteen seats for viewing games. Club seats are different from suites in that there 
is no private entertainment or reception area adjoining the seats. These club seats are 
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usually not in a private suite. However the club seats are more comfortable than the other 
seats found in the stadium. 
Table 2-6 
The Status of Teams Seeking New Facilities 
Leaguefl'eam 
Chicago White Sox 
Cincinnati RI;!ds 
Cleveland Indians 
Detroit Tigers 
Houston Astros 
Milwaukee Brewers 
New York Yankees 
Pittsburgh Pirates 
San Francisco Giants 
Seattle Mariners 
Texas Rangers 
Situation 
Threatened to move to Florida 
Threatened move 
Threatened move 
Threatened move to suburbs 
Threatened to leave region 
Threatened to leave region 
Threatening to leave NYC 
Threatening to leave region 
Threatened to move to Florida 
Threatened to leave region 
Threatened to leave Arlington 
Resolution 
New stadium in 1991 
New stadium approved 
New stadium in 1994 
New stadium approved 
New stadium approved 
New stadium approved 
Unresolved 
Unresolved 
Privately funded stadium 
New stadium approved 
New stadium in 1994 
Source: Mark S Rosentraub (1997) Maior League Losers: 1be real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
According to Rosentraub (1997b), every stadium built in the last decade has 
included these forms of premium seating to enhance team revenues and profits. Luxury 
and premium seating revenues are becoming a larger and larger portion of the income pie 
for teams, which causes owners to demand new stadiums to get a piece of the pie. The 
following table illustrates the suite and premium seating available at new facilities in 
major league baseball. 
Table 2-7 
Suite and Premium Seating in Selected New Facilities 
Facility/feam Suites Club Seats Total Capacity 
Camden Yards (Orioles) 66 3,800 48,262 
Comiskey Park II (White Sox) 102 1,833 44,321 
Jacobs Field (Indians) 129 2,OS8 42,400 
Coors Field (Rockies) 56 4,400 SO,OOO 
Joe Robbie (Marlins) 21S 6,7S0 47,662 
Humphrey Metrodome (Twins) lIS 0 S6,144 
Ballpark in Arlington (Rangers) 120 4,099 49,292 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
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Team owners have two broad sources of revenue: direct and indirect income. 
These sources are identified in Table 2-8. Rosentraub (1997b) states that the majority of 
revenue collected by sports teams is used to pay players. 
Table 2-8 
The Revenue Flow and Income Sources for Team Owners 
Di~ctmcrnn=e~S=o~u=r~c~=-________________________ ~m~d~i_~~c~t~In~c~o~m=e~S~o~u7rc=e~s __________ __ 
Ticket sales; seat licenses Team-value appreciation 
Suite and premium seating charges Related product sales 
In-stadium advertising Associated asset value appreciation 
Concessions Advertising for related products 
Parking Media value 
Other events Salary and fringe benefits 
Local media contracts Tax advantages 
National media contracts Interest on loans 
Facility and real estate rentals Public sector incentives 
Expansion franchise fees Revenue sharing 
Clothing, me:rchandise, souvenirs 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
One of the most important areas to investigate is the length of careers in 
professional sports. The careers of athletes, managers, and coaches are short, and the 
ones with long careers change teams several times (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Therefore, 
athletes and managers are not likely to have much attachment to the cities where they 
work. They tend to base their residence on the attractions of the city. 
In all professional sports, more than half of the gross revenue of a team goes to 
athletes (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1997a). However, a large portion of the 
rest goes to owners, executives, on-field managers and coaches, and scouts (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). Studies assume that all of the income earned by the players, owners and 
concessionaires is returned to the local economy (Laing 1996; Rosentraub 1997a). 
However, since most of these people do not reside where the team is located, almost all 
of their income is immediately transferred out ofthe area (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; 
Rosentraub 1997a; Ellen and Schwartz 2000). The amounts of money transferred make 
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no contribution to the local economic growth, according to Noll and Zimbalist (1997). 
Robert Baade, an economist at Lake Forest College, agrees that the money frequently 
does not stay in the local area and that this "leakage" can actually have a negative impact 
on the economy (Laing 1996). 
Rosentraub (1997a) states, when analyzing the total revenue generated by a team 
or a facility, it is necessary to remember that more than half of that total will not be spent 
in the community. Teams also spend additional funds outside the area: for equipment, 
travel, and minor league players, coaches, and managers (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
Normally, it is the taxpayer who subsidizes the stadium that showers wealth on 
the team owners (Laing 1996) and what ends up happening is a perverse transfer of 
public money to wealthy players and wealthier owners (McCormick 1997). 
Fotheringham (2000) states that the players are millionaires because the even wealthier 
owners pay such "exorbitant" salaries as a result of taxpayers who are willing to build the 
stadiums for them and increase their wealth. Since the beginning of the partnerships 
between local governments and teams in the 1980s, many things have become apparent 
with the partnership (Rosentraub 1997a). First, only one of the partners, the team, 
generally shares in the revenues or the profits earned from the operation of the venue. If 
the public sector receives a portion of the revenues, regardless of how big or small, from 
the operation of a stadium, the funds are counted as part of the private sector's 
contribution to the partnership. Fiscal returns on investment are reserved for the team 
owners while the public sector's investment, by taxes, does not generate any revenue or 
direct financial returns. Second, the team, passes the cost of its investment to fans who 
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attend games, while the public-sector partner is forced to ask all citizens to support the 
facility through higher taxes. 
Legis/ative Action 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. According to Laing (1996), there have been other 
attempts by Congress to curb the use of tax-exempt financing for sports stadiums, but 
these have only intensified the problem. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 declared that 
public financing of stadiums would lose their tax-exemption if more than 10% of the 
revenues earned by the facility were subsequently used to service the construction debt. 
Instead of stopping such activity, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 further handcuffed cities 
by putting them even more at the mercy ofteam owners. In order to payoff stadium 
debt, public officials must tap revenue streams other than the stadiums. This results in 
stadium bonds being backed by general revenue sources such as "state lotteries, sales 
taxes, hotel and motel occupancy imposts, car-rental fees and alcohol and tobacco taxes." 
Now days, stadium authorities are fortunate if professional sports teams pay enough rent 
to cover operating costs of the facility, much less contribute to the debt service. 
STADIA. Senator Daniel Moynihan (D. -N. Y.) introduced a bill to block 
prospectiVt;! stadium deals in June 1996 (Laing 1996) and again in January (Resnick and 
Ferris 1999) and March of 1997 (Shields 1999). The bill is formally titled Stop Tax-
exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, or STADIA (Resnick and Ferris 1999). This bill would 
outlaw tax-exempt bond financing for professional sports facilities (Laing 1996). 
Moynihan argues that financing of stadiums in effect constitutes a subsidy by federal 
taxpayers that largely enriches team owners and serves no legitimate public purpose. The 
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new bill would save the government about $50 million a year, now spent to subsidize 
stadiums (Resnick and Ferris 1999). 
Moynihan concedes that the proposal has no chance of passing during the current 
session of Congress and does not have bright prospects for the next year (Laing 1996). In 
order to block Moynihan's bill the United States Council of Mayors and other lobbying 
organizations have mounted a 'Jihad" against the legislation. The biggest factor working 
against Moynihan's bill is the stature of professional sports, which has taken on the 
"quality of organized religion." 
GF'CA. Along with Moynihan's STADIA bill, congressman Earl Blumenauer (D-
are.) has introduced the Give Fans a Chance Act (Fondiller 1997). This act would 
eliminate sports league rules against public ownership of teams, which would in turn give 
communitJ,es leverage to retain teams by buying out the owners. Fotheringham (2000) 
believes that the law can level the playing field in sports for the public as fans and also as 
taxpayers. The solution would be to have Congress pass a law that bars taking money 
from middle-class taxpayers to go into the pockets of wealthy Americans like the 
franchise owners. 
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
This is a review of research analyzing the use of public subsidies by major league 
and minor league basebaII cities to finance sports stadiums. The research also provides 
information on the effects of professional sports as a business on the cities that host the 
franchises. The reasons for providing subsidies to build stadiums and the legislation that 
has been passed to block the use of public subsidies is also discussed. The literature 
provides insight into who benefits most from public subsidies and stadiums: the owners 
and players or the citizens of the metropolitan where cities are located. 
The research provided in this paper came mostly from secondary sources. Two 
databases were searched for pertinent information on the topic of stadium economics. 
The EconLit database and the Business Abstract database were searched for relevant 
information. These databases led to many pertinent books and journal articles on the 
stadium economics topic. Also, periodical indexes were searched for journal and 
newspaper articles that were written on the subject. The books and articles researched for 
this paper .also provided references, which were used to gather more information on the 
subject. The Lexis Nexis database was searched for information about the pending 
legislation involving public funding for sport stadiums. However, the information 
contained in the paper does not have any new information to date. 
One source of primary information was an interview of Max Schumacher, 
Chairman of the Board and President ofthe Indianapolis Indians to get further 
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information about Victory Field. A questionnaire was drafted for the information that 
was not found in any of the articles to date. See Appendix A. 
Most of the studies undertaken by economists used questionnaires to gather 
information. This provides primary data in the research. The more recent the study the 
more inclusive the research, meaning that information that may have been overlooked by 
previous economists was realized and researched in the latter studies. 
Th,e tables that are used in the paper were taken from information gathered by 
economists from surveys and questionnaires. Therefore, the information comes from 
primary sources of the baseball franchises themselves. The information from the surveys 
was used in table form in this paper to reinforce or highlight certain topics. 
The data was analyzed by researching how stadiums impact the economy of either 
major league or minor league baseball cities through employment, fan spending and 
urban revit.alization. Information was also analyzed by whether the stadium was funded 
by a public subsidy or private donations. Only stadiums that were built with public 
funding are studied in this paper. 
Another area that was analyzed was the effect of publicly funded stadiums on the 
owners and players of the franchise. The effect of stadiums on owners and players was 
also analyz.ed in terms of how this impacted the communities where the team was 
located. 
Two cities, Cleveland, Ohio and Indianapolis, Indiana were analyzed to determine 
the differing impacts on major league and minor league basebalJ in the cities where they 
are located, especially in terms of urban revitalization. This in tum may cause an 
40 
increase in companies that move into the area; and therefore, information was gathered to 
determine how stadiums impact the decisions of companies to move into the area. 
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Case Studies 
Chapter 4 
Results 
Cities have frequently used incentives to encourage development in particular 
areas, and if teams or sports facilities do help to energize a downtown region, any public 
money dedicated to the project might be a very wise investment (Rosentraub 1997b). 
Success for these cities from their investments in sports, however, must be measured in 
terms of the extent to which downtown areas became or remained vital as employment, 
housing or recreation centers. In the Rust Belt, Cleveland and Indianapolis are probably 
the best known examples of cities that used sports as an important part of their plan to 
revitalize downtown areas (Rawn 1990; Rosentraub 1997b). This is a result of city 
leaders in the Rust Belt in the 1970s hoping that sports could replace jobs lost from steel, 
automobile and other manufacturing plants (Rawn 1990). 
Cleveland, Ohio. In the early 1980s, Cleveland was a declining Rust Belt city 
with a decaying and dying core (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The image of Cleveland as a 
shrinking and dirty city with a deteriorating center was "poignantly framed" by the fires 
on the Cuyahoga River. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Cleveland had become a place to 
live, not a desirable destination or an attraction. Likewise, after dark, downtown 
Cleveland was a foreboding and lonely place. 
Because of a declining image, Cleveland has spent more on professional sports 
teams and their playing facilities than any other community in the United States 
(Rosentraub 1997b). As a result of a backdrop in Cleveland of a declining image, 
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political conflict, and a shrinking economic and population base, planning for a new 
stadium for the Cleveland Indians began. A new stadium for the Indians was first 
proposed in 1983 to build a domed stadium in downtown Cleveland. The proposal 
included a countywide property tax to pay for the stadium, but this proposal was rejected 
by voters in 1984. 
Thle issue of the team threatening to leave Cleveland was not relevant during the 
voting for a domed stadium in 1984 (Rosentraub 1997b). In fact, the Jacobses bought the 
franchise with stipulations that the team stay in Cleveland and invest in the development 
in downtown Cleveland. This allowed the Indians' stadium to become a greater part of a 
redevelopment project instead of simply building a new stadium for the franchise. The 
Jacobses were interested in developing a shopping center, office buildings, and a hotel in 
downtown Cleveland. 
The citizens of Cleveland thought that the Jacobs family were ideal owners for the 
Indians because they would provide long-term linkages to the area and substantial real 
estate interests in downtown Cleveland (Rosentraub 1997b). The Jacobses definitely 
wanted the new stadium built in downtown Cleveland to complement their other 
investments. Richard Jacobs was a desirable owner from Cleveland's perspective as a 
result of his economic commitments and interest in downtown Cleveland. The new 
stadium with luxury boxes and club seating would not only increase the value of 
downtown real estate but also give the team the potential for revenue levels that could not 
be generated in the fifty-year-old stadium. 
Financing Jacobs Field. On March 21, 1990, Cuyahoga County commissioners 
leaped into financial support for professional sports in the form of the Central Market 
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Gateway Project, otherwise known as the Gateway Project (Rosentraub 1997b). The 
commISSIOners 
approved a public/private partnership to develop the Central 
Market Gateway Project, an economic development zone 
that includes a new publicly owned stadium and arena. The 
50/50 partnership included a $174 million commitment of 
private sector funds for the Gateway Project. To finance the 
public portion of the $344 million development, the Commissioners 
today placed an initiative on the May 8 ballot-seeking voter 
approval of a small excise tax on the purchase of alcoholic 
beverages and cigarettes (Cuyahoga County, March 21, 1990). 
The $174 million in private funds came from the sources in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 
Revenues from Private Sources Used to Finance the Gateway Project 
Anticipated Revenues 
Income from Luxury Seats 
Cleveland Tomorrow 
Property Loans 
Interest Earnings 
Total Private Investment 
$99 million 
$20 million 
$38.5 million 
$16.5 million 
$174 million 
Source: The Gateway to the Future Committee: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real costs of sports and who's 
paying for it, BasicBooks: New York City, NY. 
The costs included in building the new stadium for the Indians are shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 
The Anticipated Costs for Financing a New Stadium for the Cleveland Indians 
Anticipated Costs 
-------------------------------------------------------------Stadium construction 
Land Acquisition** 
Land for Future Development 
Financing and Working Capital 
Total Cost 
$128 million 
$22 million 
$36 - $51 million 
$67.5 million 
$343.5 million 
--~~~--=-~~~~~--~~~~~~--~--~--~--~--~~~-Source: The Gateway to the Future Committee; Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's 
paying for it, BasicBooks: New York City, NY. 
uThe land acquisition costs include the land costs for Gund Arena as well as Jacobs Field 
The "sin tax," tax on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, was proposed to bring in $169.5 
million of public revenues for the project (Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1997b). 
Six months after the "sin tax" was approved by voters, the Indians and Gateway 
agreed to lease terms on December 8, 1990 (Rosentraub 1997b). Gateway would receive 
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$]2.5 million from the sale of premium seats for the development of the stadium. When 
the lease was signed, the Jacobses and the Gateway Committee agreed to the terms that 
$20 million would be provided by the Jacobses for the development ofthe baseball 
stadium. The team paid $22.0 million (luxury seating and debt underwriting) and agreed 
to pay rent for use of the facility if more than 1,850,000 tickets were sold. 
The Cleveland Indians made two up-front contributions to the project: $20 million 
from the sale of luxury suites and the assumption of $31 million in debt (Rosentraub 
1997b). The Indians also made an up-front commitment of $20 million for the project 
and a commitment to invest $51 million in the facility. With attendance levels of 
1,995,174 fans in the 1995 strike shortened season and 3,434,000 fans in the 1996 season, 
the Indians paid Gateway $12,501,586 in rental fees. The total commitment of the 
Cleveland Indians to Gateway could be as high as $63,501,586 from rental charges, bond 
payments, and up-front payments. However, this total is dependent on the annual 
attendance level being three million. Table 4-3 gives an estimate of the annual 
attendance levels and the rental fees collected by Gateway. The table represents thirty-
year totals for the project, but the lease was signed for only twenty years. 
The Gateway development project was presented to voters as a public/private 
partnership with $174 million being invested by the private sector (Rosentraub 1997b). 
The Indians will invest around $63,501,586 over the twenty-year lease. However, there 
were other private contributors. There are five other sources of private sector fund for the 
Gateway Project. These sources are detailed in Table 4-4 along with the revenue streams 
of naming rights and parking fees. The total of all the private-sector donations is 
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$63,093,755 (Rosentraub 1997b). However this is not the final total because it does not 
take into account the Indians' contribution to the project. 
Table 4-3 
The Estimated Payments of the Cleveland Indians to Gateway 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
201 I 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
Attendance 
1,995,174 
3,000,000 
3,434,400 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
30-year lease total (percent value) 
20-year lease total (percent value) 
Suite Payment 
Bond Assumption 
20-year total 
Total Paid to Gateway 
$108,881 
1,175,000 
1,718,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,175,000 
1,233,750 
1,233,750 
1,233,750 
1,233,750 
1,233,750 
1,233,750 
1,295,438 
1,460,209 
1,428,220 
1,499,631 
1,574,612 
1,653,343 
1,736,010 
1,822,811 
1,913,951 
2,009,649 
2,110,131 
2,215,638 
2,326,420 
2,442,741 
Present Value 
$108,881 
1,175,000 
1,579,770 
993,526 
913,587 
840,080 
772,488 
710,333 
653,180 
600,625 
552,299 
533,254 
490,349 
450,896 
414,617 
381,257 
350,581 
338,492 
326,820 
315,550 
304,669 
294,163 
284,020 
274,226 
264,770 
255,640 
246,825 
238,313 
230,096 
222,161 
214,501 
$15,222,088 
$12,501,586 
520,000,000 
$31,000,000 
$63,501,586 
Source: Mark S, Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City,NY. 
The Jacobs family bought the naming rights to the baseball stadium and therefore 
pays a yearly fee of $400,000 from 1994-2003 (Rosentraub 1997b). The naming fee 
increases to $986,930 from 2004 to 2013. These figures are significantly lower than the 
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naming fees other cities have negotiated from firms that want to advertise their name as a 
part of a sport venue. 
Table 4-4 
Other Private-Sector Contributions to Gateway 
Naming Rights 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
201 I 
2012 
2013 
Total 
Annual Fees Present Value 
Parking Fees 
Annual Fees 
Source 
$400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
400,000 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
986,930 
Cleveland Tomorrow 
Interest Income 
Foundation 
Total 
$400,000 
386,000 
372,490 
359,860 
347,260 
335,100 
323,370 
312,050 
301,130 
290,590 
952,390 
919,060 
886,890 
855,850 
825,900 
796,990 
769,100 
742,180 
716,200 
691,130 
$11,665,700 
$1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
Other Private-Sector Contributions 
Amount 
$28,000,000 
$9,300,000 
$2,000,000 
$39,300,000 
Present Value 
$1,200,000 
1,103,448 
1,014,665 
993,025 
857,954 
788,924 
725,447 
667,078 
613,405 
564,050 
518,667 
476,935 
438,561 
403,275 
370,827 
340,990 
313,554 
288,326 
265,127 
243,795 
$12,128,055 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
The total costs for Jacobs Field overran the proposed costs by $48 miI1ion 
(Rosentraub 1997b). Therefore, the final costs of the stadium was $176 million instead of 
the $128 million originally calculated. Gateway Corporation's final costs reflect an 
increase of 37 percent in the construction costs from the forecast used during the 
campaign for the "sin tax." Table 4-5 reflects the characteristics of Jacobs Field in terms 
of costs with the overruns included. 
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Characteristic 
Start Date 
Opening Date 
Seating Capacity 
Club Seats 
Suites 
Estimated Cost 
Table 4-5 
Characteristics of Jacobs Field 
1991 
1994 
42,865 
2,064 
122,000,000 
Final Estimated Cost 
Overrun (percent) 
Team Investment 
128,000,000 
176,000,000-180,000,000 
37.5-40.6 
63.5 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, Editors (1997) Sports, Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and 
stadiums, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 
The Ballpark Management Company was in charge of maintaining and paying for 
the capital repairs of the facility and is owned by Richard Jacobs (Rosentraub 1997b). 
Since Jacobs is the manager of the ballpark, the company is permitted to retain all 
revenues from advertising and the sale of food and beverages. The management 
company retains revenues from: 
1. all regular season games, 
2. play-ofT games that are part of the American League's championship 
senes, 
3, any other postseason games, 
4. all World Series games, and 
5. any All-Star games played at the stadium. 
Therefore, the team is responsible for maintaining the stadium, but as the sole operator of 
the facility, shares very little of its income with Gateway. By retaining all of these 
revenues, the team was protected in assuming the responsibility of maintenance and 
repairs to the stadium. Also, the team stood to gain substantial profits through the 
operation of the stadium. 
Gateway Corporation received revenues of one-third of any new scoreboard 
advertising revenue in excess of$1.5 million (Rosentraub 1997b). This number is 
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adjusted at later dates to reflect the consumer price index. They also received one-quarter 
of all net non-baseball event revenue. 
However, the project's finances continue to deteriorate, which result from 
problems in construction cost overruns and that Gateway Development Corporation, the 
quasi-public authority that owns both venues, is not getting enough money from the 
leases with the Indians and Cavaliers to pay the debt service on $120 mil1ion in bonds 
that helped finance the project (Laing 1996). Because of Gateway Development 
Corporation's difficulties, Cuyahoga County, which guaranteed the debt, had to ante up 
$23 million to cover Gateway's debt. The county will more than likely be forced to pay 
$70 minion more over the next 16 years until Gateway can renegotiate the Indians' lease. 
According to Steve Letsky, Cuyahoga County's director of accounting, "The facilities are 
beautiful, the teams are minting money, and the county and city taxpayers are left holding 
the bag. We're paying a hen of a price for downtown economic redevelopment." 
Job Creation. Along with the elevated image Jacobs Field brought to Cleveland, 
the stadium has also produced significant benefits to the economy that has made the 
investment worthwhile (NoH and Zimbalist 1997). The opening of the Gateway complex 
in the downtown area of Cleveland has the potential to attract new businesses. The 
development can occur in two patterns. First, a portion of the recreational activity 
associated with the facilities in the region can be channeled into the downtown area. 
This occurs through the opening of new restaurants and other businesses that complement 
the sporting and other events at the new facility. Second, some businesses may be drawn 
into the Gateway area that could just as easily locate in the suburbs. 
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One way to measure the growth of new employment opportunities in the Gateway 
complex is to compare the job opportunities in Gateway with the job growth in Cuyahoga 
County and the Cleveland metropolitan area. Table 4-6 shows the changes in job 
creation from 1989 to 1995 in the Gateway complex, Cuyahoga County and the 
Cleveland PMSA area. 
Table 4-6 
Job Creation in Gateway and the Cleveland Metropolitan Areas, 1989-1995 
Total Employment Percent Change 
Location 1989 1992 1995 1989-92 1992-95 
Cleveland PMSA 1,022,139 1,007,339 1,068,010 -1.4 6.0 
Cuyahoga County 764,059 739,491 770,155 -3.2 4.1 
Gateway area 44,387 46,166 47,417 4.0 2.7 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) Sports, Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiwns, The 
Brookings Insti,:ution, Washington nc. 
Even though the Gateway area experienced a four percent increase in employment during 
the preconstruction period, the total number of jobs added was quite small (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997). Also during the preconstruction period, Cuyahoga County and the 
Cleveland metropolitan area recorded job losses of 3.2 percent and 1.4 percent 
respectively. However, from 1992 to 1995, employment levels in the county and 
metropolitan area were higher than the employment level in the Gateway complex. 
The Gateway area is a downtown economy with high concentrations of finance 
and service industries while the surrounding region includes a concentration of 
manufacturing firms (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Table 4-7 shows the changes injob 
levels within the study area by type of industry. Some of the changes shown in Table 4-7 
can be attributed to structural changes, but others might be related to the development of 
the sports facilities. 
Many ofthe documented changes that occurred in businesses in the vicinity of Gateway, 
including the recovery of certain downtown industries and the restructuring of certain 
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retail vendors, were the result of factors other than the sports facility (Noll and Zimbalist 
1997). 
Table 4-7 
Employment Trends by Major Industry in the Gateway Area, 1989-1995 
Wages in 1995 dollars 
Employment Percent Chan&e 
Industry 1989 1992 1995 1989-92 1992-95 
Total Employment 44,387 46,166 47,417 4.0 2.7 
Construction 67 104 74 55.6 -29.0 
Manufacturing 5,438 5,002 3,474 -8.0 -30.5 
TCPU* 4,097 3,776 3,517 -7.8 -6.9 
Wholesale Trade 1,870 1,967 2,143 5.2 8.9 
Retail Trade 3,241 3,341 2,887 3.1 -13.6 
FlRE** 13,749 15,648 17,138 13.8 9.5 
Services 15,514 15,723 17,227 1.4 6.7 
Public Administration (govt.) 406 596 636 46.8 -1.8 
Number of Establishments 1,364 1,325 1,301 -2.9 -1.8 
Average Wages (all employees) $37,048 $36,760 $38,856 -0.8 5.7 
Average Wages (excluding players) $37,048 $36,760 $38,057 -0.8 3.5 
Average Wages (50 percent players) $37,048 $36,760 $38,434 -0.8 4.6 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) Sports, Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiums, The 
Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 
*Transportation commWlication, and public utilities 
"Finance, insurance, and real estate 
r'"' 
Several of the businesses in the Gateway complex did experience sports-related growth, 
as a direct result of the presence of the complex. These businesses serve the fans and 
visitors to the complex and include general merchandise stores, apparel and accessory 
stores, eating and drinking places, hotels and motels, amusement and recreation firms. 
According to Rosentraub (1997b), more than twenty new restaurants have opened and a 
new hotel and other building projects have been initiated in the vicinity of the Gateway 
complex. The employment growth as a result of sport related development is shown in 
Table 4-8. 
Table 4-9 records the number of business openings and jobs created in the post 
Gateway area compared to the number of business openings and jobs created before the 
Gateway complex was opened. 
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Table 4-8 
Employment Trends in Sport-Related Industries in the Gateway Area, 1989-1995 
Wages in 1995 dollars 
Employment Percent Cbange 
Related Industry 1989 1992 1995 1989-92 1992-95 
Related Employment 3,730 4,110 5,039 10.2 22.6 
General Merchandise 1,145 919 439 -19.7 -52.2 
Apparel and Accessories 322 381 351 18.3 -7.9 
Eating and Drinking 1,153 1,384 1,621 20.1 17.1 
Hotels and Motels 779 1,019 1,087 30.8 6.7 
Amusemtmt and Recreation 331 407 1,541 23.0 278.6 
Number of Establishments 141 154 155 9.2 0.7 
Average Wages (all employees) $17,444 $15,042 $25,316 -13.8 68.3 
Average Wages (excluding players) $17,444 $15,042 $17,630 -13.8 17.2 
Average Wages (50 percent players) $17,444 $15,042 $21,377 -13.8 42.1 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) Sports. Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiums, The 
Brookings Institution: Washington D.c. 
In order to get a clear picture of the impact that the Gateway complex had onjobs 
in the area, the number of businesses that were closed prior to the complex and after the 
complex must also be examined. The information about business closings and the effect 
on employment in the Gateway area are recorded in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-9 
Business Openings in the Gateway Area by Major Industry, 
1989-1992 and 1992-1995 
Before GatewaY2 1989-92 After GatewaY21992-95 
# of Employment # of Employment 
Industry esta blishments gains establishments gains 
Total 177 1,947 183 2,251 
Construction 1 3 1 6 
Manufacturing 5 33 2 9 
TCPU* 3 35 2 31 
Wholesale Trade 5 37 8 58 
Retail Trade 50 746 41 307 
FIRE** 19 95 41 916 
Services 94 999 88 925 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) Sports Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports tearns and stadiums, The 
Brookings Institution: Washington D.c. 
*Transportation. cornmlUlication, and public utilities 
**Finance, insurance, and real estate 
These two tables show that during the post Gateway period more establishments 
opened than closed and the number of jobs gained through openings was greater than the 
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number of jobs lost due to closings (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). It is obvious that most of 
the dynamic changes in the Gateway area are typical of changes in a downtown economy, 
which relies heavily on service-producing industries. 
Table 4-10 
Business Closings in the Gateway Area by Major Industry, 
1989-1992 and 1992-1995 
Before GatewaI, 1989-92 After GatewaI, 1992-95 
#of Employment #of Employment 
Business establish ments loss establishments loss 
Total 123 1,578 133 1,972 
Construction 0 0 2 55 
Manufacturing 7 320 5 24 
TCPU* 3 37 8 52 
Wholesale Trade 5 19 4 44 
Retail Trade 19 168 47 722 
FIRE** 21 241 19 870 
Services 68 791 48 204 
Source: Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) Sports, Jobs & Taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiums, The 
Brookings Institution: Washington D.c. 
·Transportation, communication, and public utilities 
**Finance, insurance, and real estate 
EX4;:luding player salaries, real wages per employee in the Gateway area increased 
(Noll and Zimbalist 1997). There has been an increase in sports-related jobs as a result of 
the opening of new restaurants and hotels and the presence of the team. Also, from 1992 
to 1995 there was a net increase in the number of businesses established, 
However, in order to determine if Cuyahoga County's investment in the Gateway 
complex was worthwhile, the residents must decide if the benefits derived from the 
stadium outweigh the cost imposed to build the stadium (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). 
Since the investment by Cleveland in the Gateway Project, the city's image has been 
elevated in the national press (Rosentraub 1997b). Cleveland is no longer a city with a 
"burning river, racial riots, a depressed and decaying downtown, and conflict between its 
political and economic leadership." Cleveland is now seen as a "winner" with a 
downtown area that attracts residents, people from across the region and tourists. 
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Indianapolis, Indiana. In the 1970s, Indianapolis was a city with a declining job 
base, a deteriorating downtown core, and a very limited image in the national and 
international economic landscape (Rosentraub 1997b). By 1980, the city's leadership 
concluded that something drastic was needed to improve the image and attractiveness of 
the city and to reverse the deteriorating and declining importance ofIndianapolis' 
downtown core. As a result of the continuing loss of economic importance, redeveloping 
the downtown, as a tool for enhancing the city's role in the region, emerged as the central 
policy issue or concern for community leaders in the 1970s. 
According to Rosentraub (1997b), leaders from the public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors responded to Indianapolis' "malaise" by developing a program that focused on 
two objectives: 
1. establishing a market niche for Indianapolis in (amateur) sports and 
2. using this sports strategy to redevelop the downtown core as the 
cultural and economic center of the city and region. 
Indianapolis' approach was quite different from redevelopment efforts that focused on 
one team or a single facility. Indianapolis targeted amateur sports as an industry. 
Indianapolis also proposed to use sports and its cultural importance to attract a wide 
range of business activities to the downtown area. While the economic impacts of any 
single team or event and the amateur sports industry itself are unlikely to create a large 
change in any area, the cultural importance of sports might provide the city with the 
potential to solidify a wide range of economic interests or finns that would consider 
locating in the center of a sports capital. 
The city was detennined to show its faith in its downtown through substantial 
investments to develop the facilities to attract these events (Rosentraub 1997b). It was 
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also hoped that these tangible signs of the city's commitment to the downtown area would 
convince the private sector of the city's commitment to maintaining and enhancing the 
central core of Indianapolis. 
Indianapolis had a specific plan for economic development (Rosentraub 1 997b). 
I. There was a clear geographic focus on the downtown area. 
2. To further establish the center, public investments were made to 
enhance the downtown area including sport stadiums. 
3. To maintain a coalition of development interests, not only was a 
specific industry targeted to become a market niche for Indianapolis, 
this industry has substantial value to society and the potential to attract 
substantial support. 
4. Indianapolis' leadership was committed to the sports development 
strategy for over twenty years. 
If sports could contribute to or redevelop a downtown area, it would most likely occur 
through Indianapolis' prolonged policy focus and substantial level of investment. 
Indianapolis was quite successful in leveraging funds for its sports strategy 
(Rosentraub 1 997b). There was a $2.76 billion investment for an economic program that 
required $436.1 million from the city. 
Job Creation. Both the amateur sports and downtown development strategies 
were designed to revive and revitalize Indianapolis' downtown business district 
(Rosentraub 1997b). The development of the physical facilities within which events 
would be hosted did shift the focus of the region's entertainment and culture from 
suburban areas to downtown. However, employment opportunities did not follow. Table 
4-11 illustrates this point. 
Although Indianapolis' strategies for economic development were unable to stop 
the trend toward job development in areas outside of the downtown center, progress has 
been made in at least stabilizing the job situation in downtown. 
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Year 
1970 
1980 
1990 
Table 4-11 
.Job Location in the Indianapolis Region 
Downtown 
90,000 
100,000 
105,000 
County 
325,000 
380,000 
415,000 
MSA* 
410,000 
530,000 
650,000 
Source: Mark S Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
* Metropolitan Statistical Area 
The sports and downtown development policy in Indianapolis was part of a series 
of outcomes that contributed to a partial stabilization of the number of jobs in the 
downtown area (Rosentraub 1997b). The downtown core's share of regional employment 
opportunities declined, the absolute number of people working downtown remained 
relatively Imchanged from 1980 to 1990. This phenomenon is shown in Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12 
Employment in the Indianapolis City Center 
Employment as a Annual Payroll as a 
Percentage of Total for Percentage of Total for 
Industry Indpls. CBD Indpls. CBD 
Total estimate for city center 84,750 $1,792,971,687 
Sports-related industries combined 10.3% 4.3% 
Eating & Drinking places total 5.5% 2.9% 
Hotels & other lodging places 1.7% 0.3% 
Sports, amusement & recreation 3.1% 1.1% 
Remaining retail trade 4.7% 3.5% 
Remaining services 35.2% 33.2% 
Manufacturing 10.4% 28.9"10 
Wholesale trade 6.9"10 6.7% 
Transportation 11.0% 9.7% 
FIRE* 17.3% 10.9"10 
Agriculture 0.1% 0.0% 
Mining 0.2% 0.3% 
Construction 3.9% 2.6% 
Unclassified 0.1% 0.0% 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
*Finance, insurance & real estate 
There seems to be little doubt that the sports development strategy was successful 
in terms of attracting sports-related employment opportunities that substantially increased 
sports-related payrolls in the Indianapolis area for such employment. The growth in 
56 
sports-related employment and the payrol1 in this same area are il1ustrated in Tables 4-13 
and 4-14. The tables compare Indianapolis to nine other cities. 
Table 4-13 
Growth in Sports-Related Employees 
Selected Cities Percent Growth 
Phoenix 
Cleveland 
Detroit 
San Diego 
OrangeCA 
Portland 
Prince George's MD 
Dallas 
INDIANAPOLIS 
Columbus 
12% 
14% 
16% 
20% 
23% 
28% 
51% 
54% 
600/0 
79% 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
Even though the growth in sports-related employment was clearly substantial, its 
presence in the total economy of Indianapolis remained so small as to be almost invisible 
in terms of overall impact and importance (Rosentraub 1997b ). 
Table 4-14 
Growth in Sports-Related Payrolls 
Selected Cities Percent Growth 
--------------------~~-------------------------------------Philadelphia 53% 
Boston 53% 
Detroit 81% 
Oakland 95% 
Minneapolis 102% 
Dallas 104% 
Phoenix 120% 
Prince George's MD 121% 
Orange CA 155% 
INDIANAPOLIS 275% 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City, NY. 
In order to measure Indianapolis' success with its growth plan the changes in 
employment and payroll growth must be compared to cities that Indianapolis competes 
with for firms and jobs (Rosentraub 1997b). Therefore, Tables 4-15 and 4-16 will 
57 
compare Indianapolis' total employee growth and total payroll growth with nine other 
cities with which it regularly competes for jobs. 
Table 4-15 
Central Counties Total Employee Growth 
Selected Cities Percent Growth 
Milwaukee 10% 
Louisville 22% 
Cincinnati 24% 
Dayton 25% 
St. Louis 27% 
St. Paul 28% 
Ft. Wayne 30% 
INDIANAPOLIS 33% 
Minneapolis 52% 
Columbus 54% 
Source: Mark S Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City,NY. 
Table 4-16 
Central Counties Total Payroll Growth 
Selected Cities Percent Growth 
Milwaukee 
Dayton 
Louisville 
Cincinnati 
Ft. Wayne 
INDIANAPOLIS 
99% 
110010 
IIl% 
130% 
134% 
140% 
S1. Paul 141% 
S1. Louis 148% 
Columbus 180% 
Minneapolis 205% 
Source: Mark S. Rosentraub (1997) Major League Losers: The real cost of sports and who's paying for it, BasicBooks: New York 
City,NY 
There is little doubt that the image ofIndianapolis has substantially changed 
during the twenty years of the sports and downtown development effort. However, it is 
quite difficult to point to any specific measure of economic development and declare that 
the sports strategy worked (Rosentraub 1997b). Without minimizing the success and 
publicity Indianapolis has enjoyed, outcomes of this magnitude are so small that it is 
plausible to consider that, had the city focused on other factors, a larger economic impact 
would havl:~ been possible. Indianapolis was successful with its amateur sports strategy if 
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success is measured by the return on investment. However, if success is measured by 
growth injobs and payrolls, then Indianapolis was not as successful as other cities with 
which it competes for economic development. 
Indianapolis Indians. The Indians were one of the most successful AAA baseball 
teams in the 1980s (Johnson 1993). From 1980 to their championship season in 1989, the 
Indians won five division pennants and five league titles. In the franchises' 109-year 
existence, the Indians operated without threat of financial bankruptcy for an entire decade 
for the first time in 1991. The 1991 season was the team's nineteenth straight profitable 
year. 
Even though the Indianapolis community takes pride in the Indians' 
accomplishments, it has not demonstrated the same level of support for baseball as for the 
Colts and the Pan American Games (Johnson 1993). In some ways, the Indians seem to 
be taken for granted. Casual baseball supporters seem to think that the Indians always 
have been and always will be Indianapolis and therefore can put off enjoying the team 
until later. From 1987 to 1990 the Indians' attendance averaged approximately 4,092 fans 
per game, which is 286,457 fans per season. 
Financing Bush Stadium. Public funding for the Indians began with Bush 
Stadium when the private owner of the team died in 1967 (Johnson 1993). The city of 
Indianapolis bought Bush Stadium with a $300,000 ten-year bond at 3.5 percent interest. 
The stadium was eventually paid off in 1977. The Indians were the primary beneficiary 
of the deal with a yearly lease of $25,000 to $30,000 during the early years and $106,000 
in 1991. As the team improved, they were willing to pay more rent to the city for use of 
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the stadium. After the 1991 season, the city put $50,000 into the stadium for capital 
improvements. 
Since Bush Stadium was built in 1931, the age and run-down appearance of the 
stadium indicated that unless the city built a new stadium, they would have to subsidize 
the costs of renovations to the Indians stadium in the coming years (Johnson 1993). 
Indianapolis officials estimate that Bush Stadium already costs $200,000 per year in 
upkeep. This is a result of the city being responsible for all major structural repairs, 
while the team assumed all operational and maintenance costs. 
In 1992, Indianapolis was faced with the decision to continue to subsidize an 
AAA league team instead of investing in a new stadium to attract a major league 
franchise (Johnson 1993). City officials were also faced with the dilemma of whether 
public funds should be given for sport activities and infrastructure. Another issue 
involving building a new stadium or renovating Bush Stadium includes the fact that Bush 
Stadium was located outside the downtown area that was targeted for revitalization. 
Therefore, the Indians neither contribute nor benefit from the people generating activities 
in the regional center. So if an investment were to be made in a baseball stadium, it 
would not be "prudent" to stay at the Bush Stadium site. 
Financing Victory Field. A new stadium to house the Indians, Victory Field, was 
opened on July 11, 1996 (Appendix A). The total cost of Victory Field is $18 million. 
The stadium was financed with a 50150 public-private relationship. The Indianapolis 
Indians provide $5 million in the form of lease payments over the next 20 years. Large 
corporations and foundations in the Indianapolis area donated private funding in the 
amount of $4 million. Public funding for the stadium takes the form of the one-percent 
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restaurant tax and the five-percent bed tax on hotels and motels. This money goes into 
the Capital Improvement Boards fund for the Indians to pay ofT the other $9 million. 
Therefore, not only are the citizens of Indianapolis contributing to the construction of the 
stadium, but also any visitors to the city. 
Victory Field is owned by the Capital Improvement Board (Appendix A). This 
board leas(~s the land on which the stadium is built from the White River State Park 
Commission. The Indians have a 20-year lease with the Capital Improvement Board that 
will be negotiated every five years once the original lease is up in 2016. 
The Indianapolis Indians have full responsibility of maintenance for Victory 
Field (Appendix A). This includes day-to-day repairs and any major structural 
renovations in the future. The Indians are also responsible for all utilities incurred while 
operating the stadium. 
Minor league ballparks are starting to follow in the footsteps of their major league 
counterparts by incorporating luxury suites into the construction (anonymous 1998). 
Victory Fidd has 29 luxury suites, 13,500 permanent seats, 2,000 lawn seats and two 
picnic areas. This allows for over 15,500 fans to attend each game and spend money in 
downtown Indianapolis. 
When fans turn out for a game, their dollars overflow into the downtown area 
(Rawn 1990). Indianapolis'turnaround proves that sport is an industry that can turn a 
city's bottom line from red to black. 
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Summary 
Chapter 5 
Discussion 
The studies of Cleveland and Indianapolis show that sports stadiums can bring 
people into the area where the teams are located, but the facilities cannot spur economic 
growth. Both Cleveland and Indianapolis had an increase of sports-related employment, 
but this is a very small portion of total employment, which only had normal growth after 
the introduction of the stadium. In fact, the increase in sports-related employment means 
that there was growth in low wage, seasonal work for the cities. This does not attract 
people from other cities to the area to live and work. High wage permanent jobs 
accomplish this phenomenon. 
However, in the case of Cleveland, the downtown was elevated from a place to 
avoid by businesses and consumers to a place in which to work and visit after the team 
moved into Gateway Complex. This change came at the expense of other areas of 
Cleveland. Businesses moved from the outskirts of the city to the center. Therefore, 
there was not new growth, but just a substitution from the suburbs to the central business 
district. Also, consumers shifted their spending from the suburbs to the center of the city, 
which causes the substitution effect. 
Another aspect of the Cleveland study is the fact that the Indians have greater 
national coverage because of their major league status. This brings more fans from 
outside the city and region to visit the city. This increase in tourism adds to the spending 
in the city, and does cause a growth in the economy of the city. However, this growth is 
extremely small. Also, this growth only pertains to the businesses that benefit from the 
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sports stadium. This includes merchandise retailers, hotels and restaurants. No other 
businesses are benefiting from the stadium. 
Indianapolis has had a plan in place for 20 years for sports to help revitalize the 
downtown. However, this is coming at a great price for the citizens ofIndianapolis. The 
city is paying for these sports stadiums with bonds that are paid off with a tax of one-
percent on restaurants and five-percent on hotels. This puts the burden on anyone who 
visits Indianapolis and eats in a restaurant or stays in a hotel. However, the fans of the 
Indians are not going to be staying in hotels. The fan base for triple A baseball is in the 
surrounding community, usually a distance ofless than 30 miles. 
However, the only time economic growth occurs in Indianapolis as a result of the 
Indians is when fans come from over 30 miles away and spend money in the area 
surrounding Victory Field. Since minor league baseball does not have the national 
recognition that major league baseball does, it is extremely unlikely that fans are going to 
travel a great distance to see a game. 
Since baseball is a monopoly. owners can force cities into providing stadiums at 
the cost of the municipality and not for the team. This causes increased revenues for the 
owners and players of the franchise. As a result of the burden sports stadiums are putting 
on the cities that host the teams, legislation that is pending would benefit the cities by not 
allowing bonds to be used for these facilities. 
Even though owners and players have increasing revenues, they are not helping 
the cities repay their debt. A law that only allows teams to pay for ten-percent of the debt 
handcuffs cities even further. This does not allow the rich teams to ease the burden of the 
bonds for the city, but only increases the problem. Also, the owners and players do not 
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spend their income in the city where the team is located, but where they live, which may 
be in another city or even state. This causes even less of the money that the city spends 
on the franchise to be spent in the city and benefit businesses and citizens. 
Recommendations 
occur: 
Cities should stop using public funds to build sports stadiums until two things 
1. real benefits exceed real costs, 
2. total employment and total payroll increase to the point to bring new 
workers and firms into the metropolitan area and 
3. cities find a way to tax the activities at the ballpark so people that take 
advantage of the stadium pay for the facility. 
Until these: things happen, citizens should vote down any referendums for using public 
money to pay for sports stadiums. If this happens across the nation, then franchise 
owners would start paying for the stadiums themselves like they did in the 1950s and 
1960s. This would also lessen the salaries that can be paid for players and could end up 
leveling the playing field between baseball teams. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire directed to Max Schumacher 
Chairman of the Board and President 
of the 
Indianapolis Indians 
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Questionnaire 
1. What company owns Victory Field? 
2. Who manages the stadium and what responsibilities are included? 
3. How much did Victory Field cost? 
4. Was the stadium funded privately or publicly? 
5. What was the breakdown in terms of private and public funds? 
6. Where does the revenue come from to pay off the public funding? 
7. Who provided the private revenue? 
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